FACTS:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.
RULING:
An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.
If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal.
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal effect.
A compilation of law case digests of the Philippines in different subjects such as political law, labor law, civil law, taxation law, commercial law, criminal law, and remedial law..
WENPHIL Corporation vs. NLRC - GR No. 80587 Case Digest
FACTS:
Private respondent Mallare had an altercation with a co-employee. The following day, the Operations Manager served them memorandum of suspension and in the afternoon of that same day, Mallare was dismissed from work. Labor Arbiter dismissed Mallare’s petition for unfair labor practice for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered the reinstatement of Mallare with full backwages of one year without qualification and deduction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee dismissed for just cause but without due process be reinstated to work.
RULING:
The basic requirement of due proves is that which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The dismissal of an employee must be for a just cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement thus it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing Mallare from employment. Petitioner must indemnify the dismissed employee which depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.
Where the private respondent appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his supervisors as they tried to pacify him, he should not be rewarded with re-employment and backwages. The dismissal of the respondent should be maintained.
Private respondent Mallare had an altercation with a co-employee. The following day, the Operations Manager served them memorandum of suspension and in the afternoon of that same day, Mallare was dismissed from work. Labor Arbiter dismissed Mallare’s petition for unfair labor practice for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered the reinstatement of Mallare with full backwages of one year without qualification and deduction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee dismissed for just cause but without due process be reinstated to work.
RULING:
The basic requirement of due proves is that which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The dismissal of an employee must be for a just cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement thus it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing Mallare from employment. Petitioner must indemnify the dismissed employee which depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.
Where the private respondent appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his supervisors as they tried to pacify him, he should not be rewarded with re-employment and backwages. The dismissal of the respondent should be maintained.
UST Faculty Union vs. Bitonio / BLR - GR No. 131235 Case Digest
FACTS:
Private respondent Marinio et al were duly elected officers of UST faculty. The union has a 5-year CBA with its employer and is set to expire on May 31, 1998. On October 5, 1996 various UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly thus union and non-union faculty members convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL and that the GA was held with non-union members present. Union officers were served with a notice to vacate the union office, and CBA was ratified by an overwhelming majority. Med-Arbiter declared the election violative of the CBL while BLR director Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the CBL which constituted the covenant between the union and its members could not be suspended during the general assembly of all faculty members, since it ha not been authorized by the union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize the officers elected during the “general assembly”.
RULING:
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union’s CBL. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and he concomitant obligations that go with the new status and becomes bound by the union’s rules and regulations.
Private respondent Marinio et al were duly elected officers of UST faculty. The union has a 5-year CBA with its employer and is set to expire on May 31, 1998. On October 5, 1996 various UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly thus union and non-union faculty members convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL and that the GA was held with non-union members present. Union officers were served with a notice to vacate the union office, and CBA was ratified by an overwhelming majority. Med-Arbiter declared the election violative of the CBL while BLR director Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the CBL which constituted the covenant between the union and its members could not be suspended during the general assembly of all faculty members, since it ha not been authorized by the union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize the officers elected during the “general assembly”.
RULING:
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union’s CBL. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and he concomitant obligations that go with the new status and becomes bound by the union’s rules and regulations.
Unilab, Inc. vs. Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines - GR No. 163858 Case Digest
FACTS:
UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.
HELD:
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.
HELD:
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.
Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard Gordon - GR No. 175352 Case Digest
FACTS:
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
ISSUE:
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
RULING:
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.
The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
ISSUE:
Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
RULING:
[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.
[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.
The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al. - GR No. 171101 Case Digest
FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
RULING:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
RULING:
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
Arnault vs. Nazareno - GR No. L-3820 Case Digest
FACTS:
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
RULING:
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may incriminate or not. The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
RULING:
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may incriminate or not. The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
Salvador De Vera vs. Honorable Pelayo - GR No. 137354 Case Digest
FACTS:
P filed a criminal case against Judge X for knowingly rendering unjust judgment and malicious delay in the administration of justice before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman referred the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. P assails the referral of the case to the Supreme Court arguing that the Ombudsman, not the Supreme Court, is the one vested with jurisdiction to resolve whether the crime charged was committed by the judge.
ISSUE:
Whether the referral of the case to the Supreme Court is correct
HELD:
Yes. Before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Art. 204 and 205 can be entertained, there must first be “a final and authoritative judicial declaration” that the decision or order in question is indeed “unjust.” The pronouncement may result from either: (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function.
Siasoco vs. Narvasa - 315 SCRA 144 Case Digest
FACTS:
P filed with the trial court a complaint for specific performance against subdivision developers to compel the latter to execute deeds of absolute sale and to deliver the certificates of title to buyers.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over such as a complaint.
HELD:
No. Under the Executive Order creating it, the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to “hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific performance.”
Abbot vs. Honorable Mapayo - GR No. 134102 Case Digest
FACTS:
P was charged with a crime before the Sandiganbayan. By virtue of R.A. 7975 amending P.D. 1606, the case was transferred to the RTC. P filed a motion to dismiss which the RTC denied. P filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to reverse the ruling of the RTC. The Solicitor General filed a Comment, raising the point that the CA was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition because jurisdiction was already vested in the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari and prohibition
HELD:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was expanded in RA 7975 to include petitions for the issuance of writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Rollie Calimutan vs. People of the Philippines - GR No. 152133 Case Digest
FACTS:
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines Rollie Calimutan throw a stone at PHILIPCANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due toimpact which caused his death a day after.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rollie Calimutan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Yes, Rollie Calimutan is guilty of the crime of homicide, Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrownby petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter¶s death, despitebeing done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remainscivilly liable for such death.
That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines Rollie Calimutan throw a stone at PHILIPCANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due toimpact which caused his death a day after.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Rollie Calimutan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
Yes, Rollie Calimutan is guilty of the crime of homicide, Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrownby petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the proximate cause of the latter¶s death, despitebeing done with reckless imprudence rather than with malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remainscivilly liable for such death.
People vs. Bonnie Rabanal - GR No. 146687 Case Digest
FACTS:
On Aug. 11, 1996 at 2:00 am, a drunken and armed Roberto Pascua approached Bonnie Rabanal, herein accused, a security guard. Thereafter, Pascua kicked the podium near Rabanal causing it to fall on him. The accused clarified Pascua’s actions which eventually led Pascua to threaten his life. Pascua further demanded that Rabanal should surrender his firearm to him. While Pascua reached for Rabanal’s firearm, the latter was able to push him and grab his gun. In effect, Pascua lost his balance and fell. Thereafter, the accused shot Pascua four times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
RULING:
No. Self-defense presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person. Thus, danger must be present that is actually in existence or imminent that the danger is on the point of happening. Even if the initial aggression came from the deceased, unlawful aggression as an element of self-defense, had already ceased when the deceased fell down before he was shot by the accused. Hence, at that point, his act can no longer be interpreted as an act of self-defense but rather a perverse desire to kill.
On Aug. 11, 1996 at 2:00 am, a drunken and armed Roberto Pascua approached Bonnie Rabanal, herein accused, a security guard. Thereafter, Pascua kicked the podium near Rabanal causing it to fall on him. The accused clarified Pascua’s actions which eventually led Pascua to threaten his life. Pascua further demanded that Rabanal should surrender his firearm to him. While Pascua reached for Rabanal’s firearm, the latter was able to push him and grab his gun. In effect, Pascua lost his balance and fell. Thereafter, the accused shot Pascua four times.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
RULING:
No. Self-defense presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person. Thus, danger must be present that is actually in existence or imminent that the danger is on the point of happening. Even if the initial aggression came from the deceased, unlawful aggression as an element of self-defense, had already ceased when the deceased fell down before he was shot by the accused. Hence, at that point, his act can no longer be interpreted as an act of self-defense but rather a perverse desire to kill.
People of the Philippines vs. Anacito Opuran - GR No. 147674 & GR No. 147675 Case Digest
FACTS:
On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, Anacito Opuran, herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench. At 7:45 pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the national highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged from where he was hiding and stabbed Patrimonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can use the exempting circumstance of insanity as a defense.
RULING:
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the précised moment of the commission of the act. The accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise moment of commission or immediately before said act. Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.
On Nov. 19, 1998, 6:30 pm at Catbalogan, Samar, Anacito Opuran, herein accused, stabbed Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench. At 7:45 pm of the same day, Demetrio Patrimonio was walking on the national highway of Catbalogan, Samar. Thereafter, the accused emerged from where he was hiding and stabbed Patrimonio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can use the exempting circumstance of insanity as a defense.
RULING:
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or at the précised moment of the commission of the act. The accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise moment of commission or immediately before said act. Thus, insanity is not attendant in the case at bar.
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