Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic G.R. No. 174689; October 22, 2007; 734 SCRA 66 Case Digest

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a male transsexual, underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand (2001). He then filed a petition in the RTC to change his first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely" and his sex from "male" to "female" in his birth certificate. The RTC granted the petition. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether a person who underwent sex reassignment surgery can change his first name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.

On Change of First Name:

RA 9048 governs change of first name through administrative proceedings (filed with the local civil registrar), not judicial proceedings

Sex reassignment is not a valid ground under Section 4 of RA 9048

Petitioner failed to show prejudice from using his legal name

On Change of Sex:

No law recognizes sex reassignment or allows change of sex in the birth certificate

Sex is determined at birth based on genitals and is immutable under Philippine law

RA 9048 Section 2(c) expressly excludes correction involving change of sex

Birth certificate is a historical record of facts at birth

DOCTRINE:

Section 3 & 7, RA 9048:

Change of first name is administrative, not judicial—must be filed with the local civil registrar

If denied administratively, petitioner may appeal to the Civil Registrar General or file in court

Sex reassignment is not a ground for changing first name or sex under RA 9048

Sex in civil registry is immutable—determined at birth and cannot be changed through surgery absent legislative authority

Francler Onde vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar G.R. No. 197174 ; September 10, 2014 ; 734 SCRA 66; Case Digest

FACTS:

Francler Onde filed a petition to correct entries in his birth certificate: (1) parents' marital status from "married" to "not married"; (2) mother's first name from "Tely" to "Matilde"; and (3) his first name from "Franc Ler" to "Francler." The RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the corrections sought can be granted and through what proceedings?

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but declared it without prejudice:

First name corrections (his and his mother's) can be done administratively under R.A. 9048 by the city civil registrar—no judicial order needed.

Legitimacy correction (changing parents' status from married to not married) is substantial and requires adversarial proceedings under Rule 108, with all interested parties (parents) impleaded.

Petitioner failed to implead necessary parties (his parents) as required by Rule 108, Section 3.

DOCTRINE:

R.A. 9048 allows administrative correction of clerical/typographical errors and first name changes without judicial order

Substantial corrections (affecting legitimacy, citizenship, filiation) require adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 with all interested parties impleaded

Civil registrar alone is insufficient as respondent for substantial corrections

Gerbert R. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571 ; August 11, 2010 Case Digest

FACTS:

Gerbert R. Corpuz, a former Filipino who became a naturalized Canadian citizen in 2000, married Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas (a Filipina) in Pasig City on January 18, 2005. Shortly after the wedding, Gerbert left for Canada due to work commitments. When he returned in April 2005, he discovered his wife was having an affair. He went back to Canada and filed for divorce, which was granted by the Superior Court of Justice in Windsor, Ontario on December 8, 2005 (effective January 8, 2006).

Two years later, Gerbert wanted to remarry another Filipina in the Philippines. He registered the Canadian divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry, but the NSO informed him the marriage still subsists under Philippine law and required judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree. Gerbert then filed a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce with the RTC. Daisylyn did not oppose and even expressed her desire for the same relief.

ISSUE:

Whether a naturalized foreign citizen (the alien spouse) has the legal standing to petition a Philippine court for recognition of a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held:

Only the Filipino spouse can invoke Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code—the alien spouse cannot claim rights under this provision.

However, the alien spouse still has legal standing to petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (effect of foreign judgments). The foreign divorce decree itself serves as presumptive evidence of a right sufficient to give the alien spouse legal interest to file the petition.

The Court ordered the case remanded to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree complies with Canadian law (since proof of foreign law was not submitted).

The Court also ruled that the Pasig City Civil Registry acted improperly by annotating the divorce decree without judicial recognition—such registration is void and produces no legal effect.

DOCTRINE:

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is intended solely for the benefit of the Filipino spouse to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino remains married while the alien spouse is no longer bound by the marriage after obtaining a valid foreign divorce.

However, an alien spouse may still petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as the foreign judgment serves as presumptive evidence of a right, giving the alien sufficient legal interest to seek recognition.

Registration of foreign divorce decrees in the civil registry requires prior judicial recognition—civil registrars cannot register foreign divorce decrees based solely on their presentation.

Rufina Luy Lim vs Court of Appeals GR 124715 ; January 24, 2000 ; 323 SCRA 102 Case Digest

FACTS:

Rufina Luy Lim, surviving spouse of Pastor Y. Lim, filed a petition for intestate estate settlement. She sought to include in the inventory five corporations (Auto Truck TBA Corp., Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributors, Alliance Marketing Corp., Action Company, Inc.) and their properties registered under the Torrens system, claiming Pastor owned all capital, assets, and equity, and that stockholders/officers were mere dummies. The probate court initially excluded the properties, then reversed itself and ordered their inclusion. Private respondent corporations filed certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether a probate court may include in the estate inventory: (1) corporations themselves, and (2) properties registered under the Torrens system in the corporations' names.

RULING:

Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED. The probate court overstepped its jurisdiction. While probate courts may provisionally determine title for inventory purposes, such authority must be exercised judiciously. Here, properties were registered under the Torrens system in the corporations' names—entitled to presumptive conclusiveness. Without strong compelling evidence, registered title holders should be considered owners until title is nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. Petitioner failed to present such evidence. The corporations, having separate juridical personalities, cannot be included in the estate inventory absent clear and convincing proof to pierce the corporate veil. Affidavits alleging dummy incorporators were inadmissible hearsay—affiants were not presented for cross-examination.

DOCTRINE:

Probate courts have limited jurisdiction; title determination is provisional only

Torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked in probate proceedings

Presumptive conclusiveness of Torrens title must be given due weight absent strong compelling evidence

Corporations have separate juridical personality; piercing the corporate veil requires clear and convincing evidence of control, fraud, and proximate injury

Affidavits are hearsay and inadmissible unless affiants testify and are cross-examined

Restituto M. Alcantara vs. Rosita A. Alcantara, GR. No. 167746; August 28, 2007 Case Digest

FACTS:

Restituto and Rosita Alcantara were married in 1976. In 2001, Restituto filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that Rosita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. He claimed Rosita showed immaturity, irresponsibility, and lack of respect, causing frequent quarrels and abandonment of the family.

The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rosita’s acts were not equivalent to psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. Restituto elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether Rosita was psychologically incapacitated to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

RULING:

No. Rosita was not proven to be psychologically incapacitated.

Psychological incapacity must be grave, antecedent, and incurable, as laid down in Santos v. CA and Republic v. Molina. The evidence merely showed difficulties, immaturity, and irreconcilable differences, which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity. Mere failure, neglect, or refusal to perform marital obligations does not automatically mean incapacity.

The Court affirmed the CA and upheld the validity of the marriage.

DOCTRINE:

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 requires serious mental incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, rendering a spouse incapable of assuming essential marital obligations. Mere stubbornness, immaturity, or marital discord does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. Liberty D. Albios, GR. No. 198780; October 16, 2013 Case Digest

FACTS:

Liberty Albios, a Filipina, married a Japanese national, Norihito Motohashi, in Parañaque in 2001. Albios admitted she married him solely for the purpose of acquiring Japanese citizenship, without any real intention of living with him as husband and wife. After gaining Japanese nationality, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio due to lack of consent and cause.

The RTC granted her petition, declaring the marriage void. The Republic, through the OSG, appealed, arguing that the marriage is valid because marriage for convenience is not among the grounds to declare it void under the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether a marriage entered into solely for the purpose of acquiring foreign citizenship is void ab initio.

RULING:

No. The marriage is valid.

Marriage of convenience is not a ground to declare a marriage void under the Family Code. What is essential is that the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. In this case, both parties had legal capacity, consent, and a valid ceremony before an authorized officer. Motive or purpose (even if merely to acquire citizenship) does not affect the validity of marriage if requisites are present.

The Court stressed that it cannot create new grounds for nullity of marriage outside what the law provides.

DOCTRINE:

A marriage entered into for convenience (such as to acquire foreign citizenship) is not void ab initio, provided the essential and formal requisites are present. The purpose or motive of the parties does not affect the validity of marriage.

Continental Steel vs. Montaño, GR. No. 182836; October 13, 2009 Case Digest

FACTS:

Continental Steel implemented a redundancy program and dismissed several employees, including Montaño. Montaño challenged his dismissal, claiming that the redundancy was a mere pretext and that due process was not observed.

The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal as valid. The NLRC reversed, ruling that the redundancy program was not proven to be bona fide.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. Continental Steel elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Was Montaño’s dismissal due to redundancy valid under the Labor Code?

RULING:

No. The dismissal was invalid.

REASONING:

For a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must show:

1. Written notice to the employee and DOLE at least 1 month prior,

2. Payment of separation pay,

3. Good faith in abolishing redundant positions,

4. Fair and reasonable criteria in determining which employees are redundant.

Continental Steel failed to prove good faith and fair criteria. The evidence did not show that Montaño’s position was unnecessary or superfluous. Redundancy is not a prerogative to ease out employees arbitrarily; it must be backed by substantial proof.

Thus, Montaño’s dismissal was declared illegal.

DOCTRINE:

A valid redundancy program requires compliance with the substantive and procedural requisites under the Labor Code. Employers must prove good faith and use fair, reasonable criteria in dismissing employees.

Carmen Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao, GR. No. 26795; July 31, 1970 Case Digest

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing filed a case to compel Felix Icao to recognize her as his illegitimate child and to provide support.

She presented documentary evidence, including letters allegedly written by Icao, to prove filiation.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish filiation under the Civil Code.

On appeal, the issue was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Can filiation be proved by private handwritten documents (letters) acknowledging the child, even if they are not public documents or official records?

RULING:

Yes. Filiation may be proved by private handwritten documents, provided they clearly acknowledge the child.

REASONING:

Under Article 278 of the Civil Code (now Article 172 of the Family Code), filiation of illegitimate children may be proved by:

1. The record of birth,

2. A will,

3. A statement before a court of record, or

4. Any authentic writing of the parent.

The term “authentic writing” includes private handwritten documents of the parent acknowledging the child, even if not notarized.

In this case, the letters written by Felix Icao to Carmen’s mother were clear acknowledgments of paternity.

The Court stressed that what is important is the clear and unmistakable recognition of the child by the parent, not the formality of the document.

DOCTRINE:

Filiation of an illegitimate child may be established by private handwritten documents of the parent acknowledging the child, even if not notarized.

Antonio Geluz vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. L-16439; July 20, 1961 Case Digest

FACTS:

Antonio Geluz, a physician, performed several abortions on the wife of Herminigildo Capili without the latter’s knowledge or consent. Herminigildo sued Dr. Geluz for damages, claiming that the abortions deprived him of his right to be a father and of the company of his unborn children.

The Court of First Instance awarded damages in favor of Herminigildo. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award.

Dr. Geluz appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Can the husband recover damages from a physician for the abortion of his wife’s conceived but unborn child, allegedly without his knowledge or consent?

RULING:

No. The husband cannot recover damages.

REASONING:

The unborn fetus has no juridical personality until it is born alive. Under the Civil Code, the fetus is considered born for purposes favorable to it, provided it is born alive.

The husband’s right to the company of his unborn child is merely an inchoate right, not a legal right enforceable in damages.

Damages are recoverable only if there is a legal right violated. Since juridical personality of the fetus begins only at live birth, the alleged right of the husband to recover for its loss does not legally exist.

While abortion may constitute a crime against the state, civil damages in favor of the husband do not arise absent a legally protected right.

DOCTRINE:

The juridical personality of a conceived child begins only upon live birth. Until then, no enforceable rights arise in favor of the parents for its loss.

Alabang Country Club, Inc., et al. vs. NLRC, et al. - GR No. 157611 Case Digest

FACTS:

Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that operates and maintains a country club and various sports and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability of ACCI’s Food and Beverage Department (F & B Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B Department had been incurring substantial losses.

Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the management decided to cease from operating the department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its own food and beverage business within the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employee’s individual letters informing them that their services were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The Union in turn, with the authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the club’s right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause, particularly to secure its continued viability and existence is valid.

HELD:

When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same to a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated the employment of all personnel assigned at the department.

Petitioner’s failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial losses notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure or cessation of an undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

The closure of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a company’s activities.

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Anastascio D. Abad - GR No. 158045 Case Digest

FACTS:

Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank now Equitable PCI Bank)], when he was dismissed from his work. Abad received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Bank’s valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-town checks of Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or encashment as local clearing checks. During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner Bank, several transactions violative of the Bank’s Policies and Rules and Regulations were uncovered by the Fact-Finding Committee.

Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued another Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of Abad, petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his employment effective immediately upon receipt of the same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service to respondent is gross, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

HELD:

The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay.

As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.

JAKA Food Processing vs. Pacot - GR No. 151378 Case Digest

FACTS:

Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the Corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It was not disputed that they were terminated without complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice upon the employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended date of termination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when employers effected termination without complying with the twin notice rule.

RULING:

The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.

Accordingly, it is wise to hold that:

1) If the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee.

2) If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount of Php50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

Agabon vs. NLRC / Riviera Home - GR No. 158693 Case Digest

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money claims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.

Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.

Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay later” which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights warrants the payment of nominal damages.

Serrano vs. NLRC / ISETANN - GR No. 117040 Case Digest

FACTS:

Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation pay.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.

RULING:

An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.

If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground for considering dismissal illegal.

If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal effect.

WENPHIL Corporation vs. NLRC - GR No. 80587 Case Digest

FACTS:

Private respondent Mallare had an altercation with a co-employee. The following day, the Operations Manager served them memorandum of suspension and in the afternoon of that same day, Mallare was dismissed from work. Labor Arbiter dismissed Mallare’s petition for unfair labor practice for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered the reinstatement of Mallare with full backwages of one year without qualification and deduction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an employee dismissed for just cause but without due process be reinstated to work.

RULING:

The basic requirement of due proves is that which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The dismissal of an employee must be for a just cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement thus it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing Mallare from employment. Petitioner must indemnify the dismissed employee which depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.

Where the private respondent appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his supervisors as they tried to pacify him, he should not be rewarded with re-employment and backwages. The dismissal of the respondent should be maintained.

UST Faculty Union vs. Bitonio / BLR - GR No. 131235 Case Digest

FACTS:

Private respondent Marinio et al were duly elected officers of UST faculty. The union has a 5-year CBA with its employer and is set to expire on May 31, 1998. On October 5, 1996 various UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly thus union and non-union faculty members convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL and that the GA was held with non-union members present. Union officers were served with a notice to vacate the union office, and CBA was ratified by an overwhelming majority. Med-Arbiter declared the election violative of the CBL while BLR director Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the CBL which constituted the covenant between the union and its members could not be suspended during the general assembly of all faculty members, since it ha not been authorized by the union.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recognize the officers elected during the “general assembly”.

RULING:

Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only signify the intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union’s CBL. An employee who becomes a union member acquires the rights and he concomitant obligations that go with the new status and becomes bound by the union’s rules and regulations.

Unilab, Inc. vs. Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines - GR No. 163858 Case Digest

FACTS:

UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

HELD:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.

It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.

Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard Gordon - GR No. 175352 Case Digest

FACTS:

Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5, [1] held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

ISSUE:

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

RULING:

[The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
     
The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case.  We have reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the Court could have based its judgment.  Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively.  The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations.  The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code.

[T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law.  This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties.  It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements.  Its humanitarian work is unparalleled.

The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore stay.

[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al. - GR No. 171101 Case Digest

FACTS:

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”

The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.

ISSUES:

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?

(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?

(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?

(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

RULING:

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case.  The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs.  Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares.  Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share).  The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

Arnault vs. Nazareno - GR No. L-3820 Case Digest

FACTS:

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?

2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session?

3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

RULING:

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx                          

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx                      

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may incriminate or not. The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.