Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic G.R. No. 174689; October 22, 2007; 734 SCRA 66 Case Digest

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a male transsexual, underwent sex reassignment surgery in Thailand (2001). He then filed a petition in the RTC to change his first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely" and his sex from "male" to "female" in his birth certificate. The RTC granted the petition. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether a person who underwent sex reassignment surgery can change his first name and sex in his birth certificate.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.

On Change of First Name:

RA 9048 governs change of first name through administrative proceedings (filed with the local civil registrar), not judicial proceedings

Sex reassignment is not a valid ground under Section 4 of RA 9048

Petitioner failed to show prejudice from using his legal name

On Change of Sex:

No law recognizes sex reassignment or allows change of sex in the birth certificate

Sex is determined at birth based on genitals and is immutable under Philippine law

RA 9048 Section 2(c) expressly excludes correction involving change of sex

Birth certificate is a historical record of facts at birth

DOCTRINE:

Section 3 & 7, RA 9048:

Change of first name is administrative, not judicial—must be filed with the local civil registrar

If denied administratively, petitioner may appeal to the Civil Registrar General or file in court

Sex reassignment is not a ground for changing first name or sex under RA 9048

Sex in civil registry is immutable—determined at birth and cannot be changed through surgery absent legislative authority

Francler Onde vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar G.R. No. 197174 ; September 10, 2014 ; 734 SCRA 66; Case Digest

FACTS:

Francler Onde filed a petition to correct entries in his birth certificate: (1) parents' marital status from "married" to "not married"; (2) mother's first name from "Tely" to "Matilde"; and (3) his first name from "Franc Ler" to "Francler." The RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the corrections sought can be granted and through what proceedings?

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but declared it without prejudice:

First name corrections (his and his mother's) can be done administratively under R.A. 9048 by the city civil registrar—no judicial order needed.

Legitimacy correction (changing parents' status from married to not married) is substantial and requires adversarial proceedings under Rule 108, with all interested parties (parents) impleaded.

Petitioner failed to implead necessary parties (his parents) as required by Rule 108, Section 3.

DOCTRINE:

R.A. 9048 allows administrative correction of clerical/typographical errors and first name changes without judicial order

Substantial corrections (affecting legitimacy, citizenship, filiation) require adversarial proceedings under Rule 108 with all interested parties impleaded

Civil registrar alone is insufficient as respondent for substantial corrections

Gerbert R. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571 ; August 11, 2010 Case Digest

FACTS:

Gerbert R. Corpuz, a former Filipino who became a naturalized Canadian citizen in 2000, married Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas (a Filipina) in Pasig City on January 18, 2005. Shortly after the wedding, Gerbert left for Canada due to work commitments. When he returned in April 2005, he discovered his wife was having an affair. He went back to Canada and filed for divorce, which was granted by the Superior Court of Justice in Windsor, Ontario on December 8, 2005 (effective January 8, 2006).

Two years later, Gerbert wanted to remarry another Filipina in the Philippines. He registered the Canadian divorce decree with the Pasig City Civil Registry, but the NSO informed him the marriage still subsists under Philippine law and required judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree. Gerbert then filed a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce with the RTC. Daisylyn did not oppose and even expressed her desire for the same relief.

ISSUE:

Whether a naturalized foreign citizen (the alien spouse) has the legal standing to petition a Philippine court for recognition of a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

RULING:

The Supreme Court reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held:

Only the Filipino spouse can invoke Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code—the alien spouse cannot claim rights under this provision.

However, the alien spouse still has legal standing to petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (effect of foreign judgments). The foreign divorce decree itself serves as presumptive evidence of a right sufficient to give the alien spouse legal interest to file the petition.

The Court ordered the case remanded to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree complies with Canadian law (since proof of foreign law was not submitted).

The Court also ruled that the Pasig City Civil Registry acted improperly by annotating the divorce decree without judicial recognition—such registration is void and produces no legal effect.

DOCTRINE:

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is intended solely for the benefit of the Filipino spouse to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino remains married while the alien spouse is no longer bound by the marriage after obtaining a valid foreign divorce.

However, an alien spouse may still petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as the foreign judgment serves as presumptive evidence of a right, giving the alien sufficient legal interest to seek recognition.

Registration of foreign divorce decrees in the civil registry requires prior judicial recognition—civil registrars cannot register foreign divorce decrees based solely on their presentation.

Rufina Luy Lim vs Court of Appeals GR 124715 ; January 24, 2000 ; 323 SCRA 102 Case Digest

FACTS:

Rufina Luy Lim, surviving spouse of Pastor Y. Lim, filed a petition for intestate estate settlement. She sought to include in the inventory five corporations (Auto Truck TBA Corp., Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributors, Alliance Marketing Corp., Action Company, Inc.) and their properties registered under the Torrens system, claiming Pastor owned all capital, assets, and equity, and that stockholders/officers were mere dummies. The probate court initially excluded the properties, then reversed itself and ordered their inclusion. Private respondent corporations filed certiorari with the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether a probate court may include in the estate inventory: (1) corporations themselves, and (2) properties registered under the Torrens system in the corporations' names.

RULING:

Petition DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED. The probate court overstepped its jurisdiction. While probate courts may provisionally determine title for inventory purposes, such authority must be exercised judiciously. Here, properties were registered under the Torrens system in the corporations' names—entitled to presumptive conclusiveness. Without strong compelling evidence, registered title holders should be considered owners until title is nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. Petitioner failed to present such evidence. The corporations, having separate juridical personalities, cannot be included in the estate inventory absent clear and convincing proof to pierce the corporate veil. Affidavits alleging dummy incorporators were inadmissible hearsay—affiants were not presented for cross-examination.

DOCTRINE:

Probate courts have limited jurisdiction; title determination is provisional only

Torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked in probate proceedings

Presumptive conclusiveness of Torrens title must be given due weight absent strong compelling evidence

Corporations have separate juridical personality; piercing the corporate veil requires clear and convincing evidence of control, fraud, and proximate injury

Affidavits are hearsay and inadmissible unless affiants testify and are cross-examined

Restituto M. Alcantara vs. Rosita A. Alcantara, GR. No. 167746; August 28, 2007 Case Digest

FACTS:

Restituto and Rosita Alcantara were married in 1976. In 2001, Restituto filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that Rosita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations. He claimed Rosita showed immaturity, irresponsibility, and lack of respect, causing frequent quarrels and abandonment of the family.

The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Rosita’s acts were not equivalent to psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. Restituto elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether Rosita was psychologically incapacitated to warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

RULING:

No. Rosita was not proven to be psychologically incapacitated.

Psychological incapacity must be grave, antecedent, and incurable, as laid down in Santos v. CA and Republic v. Molina. The evidence merely showed difficulties, immaturity, and irreconcilable differences, which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity. Mere failure, neglect, or refusal to perform marital obligations does not automatically mean incapacity.

The Court affirmed the CA and upheld the validity of the marriage.

DOCTRINE:

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 requires serious mental incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, rendering a spouse incapable of assuming essential marital obligations. Mere stubbornness, immaturity, or marital discord does not constitute psychological incapacity.

Republic vs. Liberty D. Albios, GR. No. 198780; October 16, 2013 Case Digest

FACTS:

Liberty Albios, a Filipina, married a Japanese national, Norihito Motohashi, in Parañaque in 2001. Albios admitted she married him solely for the purpose of acquiring Japanese citizenship, without any real intention of living with him as husband and wife. After gaining Japanese nationality, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio due to lack of consent and cause.

The RTC granted her petition, declaring the marriage void. The Republic, through the OSG, appealed, arguing that the marriage is valid because marriage for convenience is not among the grounds to declare it void under the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether a marriage entered into solely for the purpose of acquiring foreign citizenship is void ab initio.

RULING:

No. The marriage is valid.

Marriage of convenience is not a ground to declare a marriage void under the Family Code. What is essential is that the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. In this case, both parties had legal capacity, consent, and a valid ceremony before an authorized officer. Motive or purpose (even if merely to acquire citizenship) does not affect the validity of marriage if requisites are present.

The Court stressed that it cannot create new grounds for nullity of marriage outside what the law provides.

DOCTRINE:

A marriage entered into for convenience (such as to acquire foreign citizenship) is not void ab initio, provided the essential and formal requisites are present. The purpose or motive of the parties does not affect the validity of marriage.

Continental Steel vs. Montaño, GR. No. 182836; October 13, 2009 Case Digest

FACTS:

Continental Steel implemented a redundancy program and dismissed several employees, including Montaño. Montaño challenged his dismissal, claiming that the redundancy was a mere pretext and that due process was not observed.

The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal as valid. The NLRC reversed, ruling that the redundancy program was not proven to be bona fide.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. Continental Steel elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Was Montaño’s dismissal due to redundancy valid under the Labor Code?

RULING:

No. The dismissal was invalid.

REASONING:

For a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must show:

1. Written notice to the employee and DOLE at least 1 month prior,

2. Payment of separation pay,

3. Good faith in abolishing redundant positions,

4. Fair and reasonable criteria in determining which employees are redundant.

Continental Steel failed to prove good faith and fair criteria. The evidence did not show that Montaño’s position was unnecessary or superfluous. Redundancy is not a prerogative to ease out employees arbitrarily; it must be backed by substantial proof.

Thus, Montaño’s dismissal was declared illegal.

DOCTRINE:

A valid redundancy program requires compliance with the substantive and procedural requisites under the Labor Code. Employers must prove good faith and use fair, reasonable criteria in dismissing employees.

Carmen Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao, GR. No. 26795; July 31, 1970 Case Digest

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing filed a case to compel Felix Icao to recognize her as his illegitimate child and to provide support.

She presented documentary evidence, including letters allegedly written by Icao, to prove filiation.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish filiation under the Civil Code.

On appeal, the issue was elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Can filiation be proved by private handwritten documents (letters) acknowledging the child, even if they are not public documents or official records?

RULING:

Yes. Filiation may be proved by private handwritten documents, provided they clearly acknowledge the child.

REASONING:

Under Article 278 of the Civil Code (now Article 172 of the Family Code), filiation of illegitimate children may be proved by:

1. The record of birth,

2. A will,

3. A statement before a court of record, or

4. Any authentic writing of the parent.

The term “authentic writing” includes private handwritten documents of the parent acknowledging the child, even if not notarized.

In this case, the letters written by Felix Icao to Carmen’s mother were clear acknowledgments of paternity.

The Court stressed that what is important is the clear and unmistakable recognition of the child by the parent, not the formality of the document.

DOCTRINE:

Filiation of an illegitimate child may be established by private handwritten documents of the parent acknowledging the child, even if not notarized.

Antonio Geluz vs. Court of Appeals, GR. No. L-16439; July 20, 1961 Case Digest

FACTS:

Antonio Geluz, a physician, performed several abortions on the wife of Herminigildo Capili without the latter’s knowledge or consent. Herminigildo sued Dr. Geluz for damages, claiming that the abortions deprived him of his right to be a father and of the company of his unborn children.

The Court of First Instance awarded damages in favor of Herminigildo. The Court of Appeals affirmed the award.

Dr. Geluz appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Can the husband recover damages from a physician for the abortion of his wife’s conceived but unborn child, allegedly without his knowledge or consent?

RULING:

No. The husband cannot recover damages.

REASONING:

The unborn fetus has no juridical personality until it is born alive. Under the Civil Code, the fetus is considered born for purposes favorable to it, provided it is born alive.

The husband’s right to the company of his unborn child is merely an inchoate right, not a legal right enforceable in damages.

Damages are recoverable only if there is a legal right violated. Since juridical personality of the fetus begins only at live birth, the alleged right of the husband to recover for its loss does not legally exist.

While abortion may constitute a crime against the state, civil damages in favor of the husband do not arise absent a legally protected right.

DOCTRINE:

The juridical personality of a conceived child begins only upon live birth. Until then, no enforceable rights arise in favor of the parents for its loss.

Alabang Country Club, Inc., et al. vs. NLRC, et al. - GR No. 157611 Case Digest

FACTS:

Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that operates and maintains a country club and various sports and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability of ACCI’s Food and Beverage Department (F & B Department). Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B Department had been incurring substantial losses.

Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the management decided to cease from operating the department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its own food and beverage business within the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employee’s individual letters informing them that their services were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The Union in turn, with the authority of individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the club’s right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause, particularly to secure its continued viability and existence is valid.

HELD:

When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same to a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated the employment of all personnel assigned at the department.

Petitioner’s failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial losses notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure or cessation of an undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

The closure of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a company’s activities.

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Anastascio D. Abad - GR No. 158045 Case Digest

FACTS:

Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank now Equitable PCI Bank)], when he was dismissed from his work. Abad received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the irregular clearing of PNB-Naval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Bank’s valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-town checks of Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or encashment as local clearing checks. During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner Bank, several transactions violative of the Bank’s Policies and Rules and Regulations were uncovered by the Fact-Finding Committee.

Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued another Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with the explanations of Abad, petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his employment effective immediately upon receipt of the same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service to respondent is gross, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

HELD:

The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay.

As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just causes is based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.

JAKA Food Processing vs. Pacot - GR No. 151378 Case Digest

FACTS:

Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the Corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It was not disputed that they were terminated without complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice upon the employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended date of termination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when employers effected termination without complying with the twin notice rule.

RULING:

The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer opts to install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.

Accordingly, it is wise to hold that:

1) If the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee.

2) If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount of Php50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

Agabon vs. NLRC / Riviera Home - GR No. 158693 Case Digest

FACTS:

Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of petitioner’s abandonment of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money claims.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:

To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work without a valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.

Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.

Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized by law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay later” which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights warrants the payment of nominal damages.